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ABSTRACT
Many developed countries have proposed enlarging the mandate of the WTO to protect
the environment and labor rights. The idea was fiercely challenged by third-world countries
becoming an unsurpassable obstacle in the negotiations. For supporters of a stronger WTO, the
TRIPS Agreement is a good example that underscores the need to back up the trading system to
enforce standards. This analysis attempts to demonstrate that there are less controversial
alternatives to achieve environmental and social goals. The different nature of IPR and labor
rights makes the TRIPS Agreement a weak example to prove the goodness of enforcing
standards through the WTO. Moreover, certain gaps in this Agreement provide developing
countries wit enough reasons to believe that a broader WTO scope would serve to disguise
protectionist measures. Overarching the WTO members with obligations other than those which
led their incorporation would be an encroachment of national sovereignty. However, since trade
affects other areas of international law grater coherence is necessary.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1994, the World Trade Organization has captured the attention not only
of groups related to trade and economy but also of environmental groups, labor unions, human
rights activists, and press people, among others. However this organization has been as much
applauded as criticized. Many have blamed the WTO of no respecting other areas of
international law, such as environmental regulation and the development of labor rights.
Although we are firmly in favor of the necessity of greater coherence, this paper intends to
analyze the disadvantages of incorporating rules belonging to other fields of international law
into the international trading system, such us the so-called social clause.
Thus Chapter II explores the history and the nature of the WTO, whose objectives show that it
was conceived as an economic organization, in which members assume commitments and grant
concessions for the purpose of attaining development and economic growth. In our opinion, it
would be illegitimate to overcharge the members with obligations totally contradictory to those
that led them to their incorporation.
Chapter III analyzes the current position of the World Trade Organization with respect to the
labor and environmental regimes. Also this section underlines the steps that members have taken
within the trading system in order to achieve grater congruence with other areas of law.
Meanwhile, Chapter IV deals with the potential implications of enlarging the mandate of the
WTO as to regulate non-trade issues. This section also discusses some widely recognized reasons
for which the addition of minimum standards for the protection of the environment or labor

2
rights could be dangerous and be perceived as an encroachment of national sovereignty. Finally,
Chapter V presents other alternatives for making international trade more sensible

to

environmental and social goals without resorting to the application of trade sanctions.
Chapter VI analizes the reasons for including minimum standards for the protection of
intellectual property rights within the world trade arena. In addition, this section examines the
gaps and impacts of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on
developing countries.
The paper concludes that there are other less questionable means for procuring reconciliation
between international trade objectives and the goals of international law in other fields than
broadening and forcing the original objectives of the World Trade Organization.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY, NATURE, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Seeking to prevent catastrophic events, such us the World War II, and bearing in mind the
decisive role the uncontrolled trade protectionism played in causing the above mentioned war,1 a
group of countries sought to create an international organization pledged to furthering economic
development and prevent the introduction of restrictive measures among themselves2.
The International Trade Organization (ITO) was conceived, in conjunction with the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as a multinational organization that would regulate
national practices affecting international trade. Until then, history had not been so kind to the
method of bilateral treaties for regulating trade between states and the new multilateral trade
arrangements promised to be a better solution in order to get stability and world peace.3
In 1946, a Preparatory Committee was set up under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic and Social Council4, with the purpose of drafting a charter for ITO. Simultaneously,
negotiations on different tariff concessions and free trade principles were taking place between
country-supporters of the ITO. Thus, in 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

1

For a comprehensive analysis of the history of the World Trade Organization [WTO] see John H. Jackson &
William J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 293 (3d ed. 2000).
2
An anatomy of the World Trade Organization 1 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos ed., 1997).
3
See Dr. Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture 4 (2002).
4
United Nations Economic and Social Council (hereinafter ESCOR).
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[GATT],5 one of the most important multilateral treaties for commerce, was signed in Geneva by
23 countries.6
In the meantime, the draft charter of the ITO was completed and opened for signatures at
Havana, Cuba in 1948. But the Havana Chapter would never enter into force due to the
withdrawal of support from the United States, whose first initiatives were directed towards the
development of an international trade organization.7 This fact left the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade as the central, albeit somewhat handicapped, device for trade negotiations at
the international level.
The GATT was never conceived as an organization. Instead, its major purpose was to put into
effect the commercial policy provisions of the ITO, an organization that would provide the
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations.8 The General Agreement, intended to
be in force just temporarily, would give contractual force to the negotiated tariff concessions and
carry into effect the already initiated process of trade liberalization. It would act additionally as a
bridging agreement between the former international economic order and the new rules-based
system.9
Having been derived from Chapter IV of the Havana Chapter, the GATT would have been
easily incorporated into the legal framework of the ITO; however, the ITO was never
established. Different tensions between the United States and United Kingdom regarding the
content of the charter, the Cold War, and an increasing socialism spread in Western Europe
marked its fated history.10
5

See, generally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
188.
6
See, Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, supra note 2, at 1.
7
See, John H. Jackson, supra note 1, at 295.
8
See, Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, supra note 2, at 2.
9
See, Rorden Wilkinson, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organization, 17 (2000).
10
Id. at 16.
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The different states had reached a consensus on the necessity for an international commercial
policy and the establishment of a permanent body to administer the rules promoting nondiscrimination. The ITO would not only have legal authority to interpret the multilaterally agreed
rules but also to provide a mechanism for settling disputes. Nonetheless, despite the efforts, the
United Kingdom struggled to incorporate clauses promoting full employment, whereas the
United States remained reluctant to place the manage of domestic employment policies in the
hands of an international body and focused its attention on the issue of tariff reduction.11
After the World War II, the enthusiasm decayed and the tendency of the United States
Congress shifted to a less liberal attitude on trade matters.12 For its part, the United Kingdom was
undergoing an increasingly difficult economic situation, lowering its support for the ITO. In
addition, the bad experience of the League of Nations, for which creation the United States put
forth much effort but never joined, discouraged the other participants from ratifying the ITO
charter.13
Given the circumstances, the GATT would act, by default, as an independent legal body and
as the ill-adapted organization where the members would coordinate national policies affecting
international trade.14 The original three-year plan of GATT life was extended once it was clear
that the ITO project was likely to fail.15
The success of the GATT survival was due to a general perception of the participants, who
saw it as a less constraining agreement. In contrast to the ITO charter, the GATT did not

11

Id. As Roden Wilkison asserts the disagreements between the UK and US were reflected in the final charter ,
making it a contradictory document. Later, they proved irreconcilable as each sought to incorporate almost
literally their favorite economic doctrines. Finally, the economic climate became markedly different from that
envisaged by the wartime planners in addition to serious concerns about the content of the charter led to the US
to refuse its ratification.
12
John H Jackson, supra note 1, at 295.
13
Roden Wilkison, supra note 9, at 17-8.
14
See John H. Jackson, supra note 1, at 295.
15
Wilkison, supra note 9, at 20.
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formally commit its contracting parties to the maintenance of full employment. This made it
more more acceptable for countries such as the United States, which saw their participation in
the ITO as a threat to their sovereignty.16
Commentators, such as John H. Jackson, argued that GATT application was controversial,
flawed and still provisional. Its rules were applied as a binding international treaty, although this
treaty structure brought itself other new problems, such as the difficulty of the amendment
process, its uncertain relationship to domestic laws, the lack of a unified dispute settlement
procedure, questions of membership, and the ill-defined capacities of the contracting parties.17
The necessity

of an institutional framework that would administer the numerous rules and

concessions made by the GATT contracting parties could no longer wait. A small organization
was established to operate GATT. Thus, for the ninth session, a draft charter for an Organization
for Trade Cooperation was completed, though this charter met the same opposition and destiny
as the ITO charter.18
Despite the GATT limitations there was not single motion during the 1980’s until 1990, when
the Canadian Government put forth a formal proposal. However, the negotiators did not reach an
agreement until December 1993. In 1994, the charter proposal of the World Trade Organization
was submitted for ratification.19 Hence, the outcome of the eight-year old trade negotiations
brought profound reform in the legal structures of the world trading system: the creation of the

16

The US refusal, followed by other states, to the ITO ratification; due primarily to the content of its charter, shows
clearly the extent to which the majority of the countries were willing to sacrifice part of their sovereignty for
their economic development. They saw this organization as part of a multilaterally agreed upon trade system in
which ITO would play the main role and work in cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and
the World Bank. This point of view emphasizes the basically economic nature of the ITO since its origins as the
WTO immediate predecessor. See Wilkinson, supra note 9 at 20-1.
17
John H. Jackson, supra note 1, at 296.
18
Id.
19
Id at 301.
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World Trade Organization. This acomplishment marked the establishment of a well-defined
institutional base for international trade.
In contrast to the ITO Charter, the charter of the WTO does not contain substantive rules but,
instead, institutional measures. Rules concerning international economic behavior have been
incorporated in four annexes, making the system flexible enough since different texts can be
added or removed over time in agreement with the evolution of institutions and policies.20
Contrary to the General Agreement, the WTO constitutes an international organization with
legal personality. It is provided with privileges, immunities, and the ability to develop relations
with other subjects of international law.21 Thus, the original signatories of GATT’s so-called
contracting parties became members of an organization, which additionally provides a
mechanism for accession of new nations.22
Although unsuccessful, the ITO was intended to be one of the three organizations conceived
during the Second World War with the purpose of coherently conducting the global economy.
This attempt was part of a post-First-World-War culture of organization building directed
towards the creation of a series of international organizations to manage key aspects of global
life.23 Similarly, the WTO does not elude this practice. It represents the culmination, though not
the end, of a political process stretching back to the wartime negotiations seeking to provide an
organizational focal point for a liberal trade regime.24
True to its objectives, the World Trade Organization not only has directed the world’s
attention towards other fields of economic activity enlarging the trade regime beyond a

20

Id, at 302.
Id, at 303.
22
Due to the fact that the GATT was not an organization, its participating nations or customs territories were called
contracting parties and not members. See Id at 306.
23
See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 2.
24
Id.
21
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traditional focus on trade in goods to include trade in services. But it also has, with the exception
of labor, moved into the regulation of trade-related aspects, such as intellectual property rights
and investment measures.25
In sum, the main functions thrust upon the WTO are to administer the Multilateral and
Plurilateral Trade Agreements, included in its legal structure, and to further their principal
objective, “to liberalize trade”.26 The failure of the WTO’s predecessors was due essentially, as
pointed out above, to the fears of its original supporters, who thought that the rules incorporated
in their charters and their participation on such powerful organizations would mean, in one form
or another, the excessive constraint of their domestic sovereignty.27
The path towards the origin of the World Trade Organization was not free of drawbacks, but
the indispensable necessity of such an organization and all its implications for achieving
developmental goals made its establishment possible. To borrow the words of professor Hans
Van Ginkel, conducting world trade according to multilaterally agreed rules has been a major
contributor not only to the enormous expansion of the world economy over the half-century but
also to the avoidance of international conflict.28
The original participants of GATT and supporters of the creation of the ITO knew about its
benefits. Nevertheless, they did not want to compromise their sovereignty more than they
deemed strictly necessary for achieving purely economic objectives. Indeed, the reason for which
the WTO Charter was ratified was its flexibility, or an elasticity that did not jeopardize the
member states’ right to regulate and implement their own policies on domestic issues. Thus, any

25

Id.
Konstantinos Adamantopolus, supra note 2, at 30.
27
See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 21 (2d ed. 1999).
28
See Hans Van Ginkel, Preface to the first edition of Gary P. Sampson, The Role of the World Trade Organization
in Global Governance (2001).
26
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change of the current trading system should not alter both the many strengths of the system or
the original will of its participants in order to respond to legitimate concerns.
Nowadays, there is a general consensus that the World Trade Organization is only one part of
a system of global governance.29 Nonetheless the new challenging tasks, such as the
humanization of the globalization process, call for greater coherence on policy making at the
international as much as the national level.

29

See, Gary P. Sampson, supra note 27 at 15.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CURRENT WTO POLICIES ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR MATTERS
3.1 Trade and Environment
The issue of the relationship between international trade and environmental protection was
almost overlooked in the world trade arena during its early periods.30 In 1971 a working Group
on Environmental Measures and International Trade was established but its labor on the matter
left much to be desired.31 The following are some of the responses of the multilateral trading
system to the necessity to conciliate two values “Trade and Environment”, requirement
indispensable to the world sustainable development.
3.1.1 The Committee on Trade and Environment
On April 14, 1994 after the Tuna/Dolphin I case,32 which attracted the world attention and the
awareness of the free trade impacts on the environment, the GATT contracting parties
established the Committee on Trade and Environment.33
The committee’s principal tasks consist in identifying the relationship between trade and
environmental measures for promoting sustainable development and making appropriate
recommendations on whether modifications of the multilateral trade provisions are needed, as

30

See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for
Reconciliation, [91 A.J.I.L. 268] 268 (1997).
31
Even though the GATT Council established the above-mentioned Working Group, it did not even meet for over
twenty years. The real changes had to wait until the Tuna/Dolphin I case decision. See Id.
32
See GATT Dispute Panel Report: United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991),
[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]
33
Committee on Trade and Environment [hereinafter CTE].
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long as, these changes are compatible with the open, equitable and non-discriminatory nature of
the system.34
Even though the CTE acts for the protection of the environment, it is not an organization
created towards that aim. In other words, the committee’s task should not exceed the competence
of the multilateral trading system, which is limited to trade policies and trade-related aspects of
environmental policies that may result in significant trade effects.35
In accordance with the Marrakesh decision, the CTE should address the following items36:
•

The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral
environmental agreements.

•

The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading
system.

•

The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and:
a. Charges and taxes for environmental purposes.
b. Requirements for environmental purposes related to products, including standards
and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling.

•

The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements
which have significant trade effects.

34

See Hakan Nordstrom & Scott Vaughan, Special studies 4 Trade and Environment, 72 (2000).
The World Trade Organization and its Committee on Trade and Environment,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu1_e.htm.
36
Hakan Nordstrom and Scott Vaughan, supra note 34 at 72-3.
35

available

at
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•

The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading
system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements.

•

The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and environmental
benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.

•

The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.

•

The relevant provisions of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.

•

Services and appropriate arrangements for relations with non-governmental organizations
referred to in Article V of the WTO and transparency of documentation.

Unfortunately, the progress on satisfactorily addressing these matters has been much too
slow.37 The CTE has undergone serious difficulties in coming to a decision due to the
exceedingly slow decision-making process of the WTO and its organs. This factor hinders the
possibility of formulating concrete recommendations for reconciling free trade and
environmental protection.
In Singapore, the CTE Report was adopted with the understanding that it would not modify
the rights and obligations of any of the WTO members under the WTO Agreements. This
condition was created to make it possible for a number of delegations to join the consensus and
approve the report.38
The Increasing number of WTO members evidences the need to speed up the WTO decisionmaking process, perhaps, as Thomas Schoenbaum suggests, through the adoption of an executive

37

As noted by Thomas J. Schoenbaum, the report, drawn up by the CTE to the Singapore Ministerial Conference
held in December 1996, shows very little analysis and evaluation and virtually no recommendations for specific
actions. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 269.
38
Report of the meetings held on 30 October and 6-8 November 1996, doc. WT/CTE/M/13 (22 November 1996).

13
committee structure that would be able to set deadlines for CTE recommendations. The same
author asserts that even with that structure, the reconciliation of trade and environment questions
could be illusory due to the complexity of issues involved and the multiplicity of viewpoints.39
3.1.2 Environmental exceptions in the WTO Regulation
Unlike the general agreements of the WTO, which cover trade in almost all their areas, there
is not an internationally agreed upon legal framework on environment. On that ground, thus far,
global problems stemming from the relationship between trade and environment have to be
analyzed in light of the WTO commercial regulation. This paper will examine the pertinent
environment-related exceptions referred to by Article XX, sections “b” and “g” of the GATT.40
Since 1982, there have been several actions brought before various GATT panels against
trade-restricted measures justified on environmental grounds. These actions were invariably
successful due to a traditional way of interpreting GATT Article XX.41 The exceedingly strict
way to construe the general exceptions allowed the least possible departure from the basic
principles of free trade.42
However, the establishment of the WTO marked a period of significant changes in the
interpretation of Article XX as well as in the refinement of WTO jurisprudence. Since 1994, the
GATT nations recognized the World Trade Organization as the governing body for GATT and
adopted a dispute settlement system to resolve international trade disputes. The new system has

39

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra note 29 at 270.
GATT, supra note 4.
41
Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of the Natural Environment: Recent
Trends in the Interpretation of GATT Article XX (b) and (g), [10 Transnat’1 L. & Contemp. Probs. 271], 275
(2000).
42
Id, at 276.
40
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provided a well-defined procedure ensuring more clarity, predictability and adherence to legal
principles.43
Under the free trade regime administered by the WTO, nations can bring complaints against
members applying policies limiting imports or constraining commerce. Usually, complaints cite
the non-discrimination principles embodied by Articles I and III of the GATT. Nonetheless, the
trade regime exempts nations from their GATT obligations under certain circumstances through
the general exceptions of Article XX. Two of these exceptions, paragraphs (b) and (g), are
related to environmental concerns and read as follows:
“...Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption...”
As noted by Carrie Wofford, the introductory clause or chapeau of Article XX, qualifies all
the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j), preventing the abuse of the rules available in Article XX.
In other words, the chapeau allows discrimination on the ground of environmental protection, as
long as it is not arbitrary, unjustifiable, or used as a cover for disguised restrictions on
international trade.44

43

Carrie Wofford, A greener future at the WTO: The refinement of the WTO Jurisprudenceon Environmental
Exceptions to GATT, [24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 563], 567-68 (2000).
44
Id. at 566.
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On that ground, the party asserting the exception must show that it is legally applicable. This
burden, however, has proven very difficult to surmount due to the strictness with which the
previous panels used to interpret these provisions. For instance, in several cases the panels found
that the measures did not qualify for an environmental exception because they were not
consistent with GATT provisions.
Nowadays, it has been recognized that an exception is, by definition, likely to be inconsistent
with GATT obligations. The chapeau clearly cautions that nothing in the agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption of such measures so long as they meet with determined
conditions.
Thus, the Appellate Body reversed the lower panel’s decision in the United States Gasoline
Standards case. It criticized the panel finding, which had concluded that the U.S. baseline
regulations had not satisfied the test of Article XX (g). The panel, in the Appellate Body’s
opinion, did not give adequate consideration to the wording of the chapeau and determined that
the U.S. baseline regulations met the requirements referred to by paragraph (g) for which the
measure could be perfectly justified under this section. However, the measure was declared
inconsistent with the non-discrimination portion of the chapeau.45
Another notable shift, that opens the door to environmental concerns, is the Appellate Body’s
more literal interpretation of Article XX. The Appellate Body has abandoned the rigid tests and
requirements that previous panels had imposed on environmental policies seeking exception to
GATT.
In this line, the Appellate Body has rejected the theory that the word “necessary”, which
qualified paragraph (b), implies that the policy seeking to be justified must be the least trade
45

See Gasoline Appellate Report: United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (Apr. 29, 1996) 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996), at 23, 35 I.L.M. at 627. [Hereinafter Gasoline
Appellate Report].
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restrictive among the measures reasonably available. Prior panels have commonly held this
interpretation as such in the Thailand Cigarettes case when a ban on imported cigarettes was
found unjustifiable under Article XX.46
Another example took place in 1991 when a GATT panel invalidated a United States import
ban on tuna caught in an unfriendly manner for dolphins. The measure demanded the use of a
special device, which impeded dolphins from beiing casually captured, injured or killed.47 The
panel used the least trade restrictive interpretation, asserting that the U.S. did not exhaust all the
options reasonably available to pursue its environmental objectives with the least degree of
inconsistency with its GATT obligations.48 Similarly, in Canada’s Landing Requirements for
Salmon and Herring, the panel concluded that the Canadian government, in demanding that
fishermen bring their catches to landing stations to be counted, was violating unnecessarily its
GATT duties.49
However, in 1996 the Appellate Body overturned the path followed in previous cases when in
the United States Gasoline Standards case, it discarded the least restrictive requirement and
rescued the true meaning of the introductory clause. Contrary to the previous cases, it interpreted
the treaty provisions in accordance with its ordinary meaning in the light of its object and
purpose according to the widely recognized Vienna Convention.50 Indeed, the Appellate Body

46

See, Thailand Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, November 7, 1990, GATTB.I.S.D.
(37th Supp.) 200, para. 74 (1990), 30 ILM 1122 (1991).
47
Tuna/Dolphin I, Supra note 32, para. 5.28.
48
The panel considered that the United States could fulfill its dolphin protection objectives through other methods
less restrictive such us the negotiation for international cooperation of the countries involved. Id.
49
See In Re Canada’s Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 I.T.R.D. 1026, (Oct. 16, 1989), paras.
7.15 - 7.18. [Hereinafter Salmon Panel Report].
50
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, opened for signature May 3, 1969, Article 31 (3), 1155 UNTS
331. The Article reads as follows:
“...In interpreting a treaty there shall be taken into account, together with the context: a) Any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.
b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation. c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties...”
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asserted that the fundamental theme of the chapeau is to be found in the purpose and object of
avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article
XX.51
Thomas J. Schoenbaum argues that the word “necessary” should not be taken as related to
whether the measure is a necessary departure from the trade agreement. Contrary to that, this
word should be construed as directed towards the protection of living things, which is the
purpose and object of the measure.52 He also asserts that any other interpretation of “necessary”
is an amendment of the wording of Article XX (b); otherwise, the least restrictive requirement
would of been literally included in that paragraph or the chapeau.53
In the United States Gasoline Standards case, the Appellate Body recognized that the United
States had the legitimate right to choose a policy that lowered its costs and reduced its
administrative difficulties rather than a less trade restrictive, but more expensive, measure. Thus,
the U.S. gasoline standards could be legally imposed so long as the measure met the
requirements set out in the chapeau.54
Lastly, the least restrictive test, states Professor Schoenbaum, exceedingly limits the
sovereign powers of states to take decisions to solve problems and satisfy their constituents. The
standard of review in the chapeau mentioned above contrarily provides a more deferential test,
allowing some freedom of action to member states.55
In the same fashion of the least restrictive requirement, the lower panels imposed another
harsh test on environmental policies seeking conformity with Article XX. This time the previous
panels demanded that policies had to be “primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural
51

Carrie Wofford, supra note 43 at 576.
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 276.
53
Id.
54
See Wofford, supra note 43 at 577.
55
Schoenbaum, supra note 30 at 277.
52

18
resources. This interpretation meant that the measure would meet the test provided that it be
adopted for conservation reasons alone.56
In the Canada’s Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring case, the panel used a costbenefit analysis. From its point of view, the benefits obtained from the landing requirement were
disproportionate to the time and effort requested. Thus, once again the panel’s opinion seemed to
be a departure from the rules of the Vienna Convention and an amendment to the wording of
paragraph (g).57
In the Tuna/Dolphin I case, the panel invalidated the measure applied by the United States on
the ground that it constituted a restriction on trade relying on unforeseeable conditions. Despite
the fact that a ban on the importation of tuna in a non-dolphin-safe way was obviously a measure
related to conservation of such species and therefore met the “relate to” requirement, the panel
badly misinterpreted the content of paragraph (g).58
In the Tuna/Dolphin II case, it was said the measure was primarily aimed at controlling the
trade behavior of others since the policy could not be effective in achieving its purpose if other
countries did not change their tuna fishing practices.59 And in the United States Automobile
Taxes case as well as in the United States Gasoline standards case, the reason argued, was that
the less favorable treatment did not conserve the resources; consequently, the measure did not
comply with the “relating to” test.60
Nevertheless, in the latter case the Appellate Body took issue with the panel opinion, pointing
out that the less favorable treatment was a consequence and not the measure at stake. The
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Apellatte Body argued that what really matters was whether the measure itself was related to the
conservation.61
The change in the treatment of this exception can also be noticed in the Shrimp/Turtle case.62
In earlier cases, panels focused on side aspects rather than on the conservation issue, such as the
aim of the measure, its area of application, and the manner in which it must be applied, among
others.63 In contrast, in Shrimp/Turtle case the Appellate Body firmly took into account the
language of paragraph (g) and examined the relationship between the measure seeking
justification and the purpose of environmental protection, finding that the U.S. law was not
disproportionately wide in scope or reach regarding the policy objective.64
It is worthy to note that in Shrimp/Turtle as well as in the U.S. Gasoline Standards case, the
Appellate Body followed a more environmental and coherent approach with other areas of
international law. It observed that the WTO agreement was not to be read in clinical isolation
from public international law. Thus, reference was made to CITES and to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea to establish the status of marine turtles.65
Another step in the evolution of the Article XX interpretation is the meaning, pointed out by
the Appellate Body, of the “in conjunction with” requirement. It was recognized that even
though this element requires certain evenhandedness it does not demand identity of treatment. In
other words, restrictions on domestic production or consumption are enough to satisfy the test set
out in the text of paragraph (g). The impacts or effects of the measure applied externally do not
have to be equal to those stemming from its internal application.66 This interpretation, as well as
61
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those described above, clearly lowers the hurdle that environmental policies must meet in
seeking justification under Article XX
The extraterritorial application of Article XX constitutes another progressive step in the
defense of the adoption of environmental measures. In the beginning, previous panels to
Tuna/Dolphin II reached the conclusion that these exceptions were applicable only to natural
resources and living things within the territory of the country invoking the provision. However,
the Tuna/Dolphin II panel distinguished between the exercise of jurisdiction of the members and
the extraterritorial application of Article XX (b) and (g).
It is internationally recognized that states can extraterritorially exercise jurisdiction only with
respect of their own nationals. A state can legitimately control the activities of its own citizens
acting outside its territory, and the panel in Tuna/Dolphin II admitted this faculty. Thus, the
panel ruled that the U.S. government could validly enforce an Article XX (g) restriction
extraterritorially but only against their own nationals and vessels.67
However, despite that limitation, it was also recognized that under international law, the
states have an obligation to prevent damage to the environment even beyond the borders of
national jurisdiction; therefore, according to this reasoning, Article XX would have
extraterritorial but not extra-jurisdictional application.
As noted by Schiano di Pepe, the depletion of a natural resource, especially of migratory
animal species, is a global problem that cannot be solved by measures adopted on a national
basis.68 But, what does this new approach do in response to environmental concerns? The
recognition of certain domestic policies, described in paragraphs (a) through (j) as exceptions to
substantive obligations established in GATT, notes the general acceptance of their importance
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and legitimacy. Consequently, unilateral measures requiring other WTO members to adopt
certain policies as a condition for its market accession can no longer be deemed a priori
unjustifiable.
3.1.3 The Status of the Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Nowadays, it is more common to resort to multilateral environmental agreements [MEAS] to
solve environmental problems. An examination of this area is of relevant importance since some
of these agreements contain provisions related to trade, which can potentially conflict with the
WTO/GATT system. So far, there exist approximately 200 MEAS, of which 20 contain
provisions that can affect trade.69
Contrary to international trade agreements, which rarely address environmental matters,
MEAS are more predisposed to contain measures involving trade restrictions. This happens due
to the fact that the subjects of the MEAS tend to be internationally traded. As a result, certain
regulations necessary to protect the environment are, under determined circumstances,
indispensable.70
Notwithstanding such a necessity, the creation or existence of an MEA involving traderelated provisions implied a potential conflict with basic WTO rules. Not only could there be
conflicts between the rights and obligations contained in an MEA and the WTO agreement, but
there could also be conflicts of jurisdiction between two institutions or adjudicating bodies
claiming the right to deal with a dispute with trade and environment dimensions.71
Gabrielle Marceau suggests that certain widely accepted rules of international law can
potentially solve the first kind of conflicts, while a conflict of jurisdiction seems to be settled by
69
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the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which claims jurisdiction over all trade-related matters
to the exclusion of other fora.72
Lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali are two principles of
international law which play a crucial role in solving conflicts between treaty provisions. The
earlier is embodied in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, while the latter, although not
mentioned in this convention, has been recognized by the jurisprudence and the doctrine.73
When two disputing states are parties to two treaties dealing with the same subject matter and
there are not specific treaty provisions, an interpretation seeking a cumulative application of both
treaties should be made. However, notwithstanding the possibility that both remain in force, by
virtue of the principle of Lex posterior derogat priori, preference must be given to the provisions
of the treaty that is later in time.74 On the other hand, when the dispute is between a state party to
both treaties and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties
will govern their rights and obligations.75
As Marceau describes, the rationale of the Lex specialis derogat generali principle is that
when the rule-makers deal with a subject matter in specific terms they are implicitly expressing
their will to set aside the general rule in favor of the specific one. Once again between parties of
two treaties dealing with the same subject, unless the parties’ intention provides otherwise, both
treaties should be simultaneously applied to the greatest extent possible, even if the specific
provisions of one supersede the general rules of the other. On the contrary, when a third state that

72

Id.
Id. at 1090.
74
See Vienna Convention, supra note 49, art. 30.3.
75
Id. Article 30.4.
73

23
is a party to just one of the treaties is involved, any suspension or abrogation can be made
without respecting its rights and obligations embodied in the superseded treaty.76
As should be noticed, it is more likely that problems arise between signatory countries of an
MEA adopting measures that can affect rights and obligations of nonparties of the environmental
treaty in question. A similar problem is caused by an MEA with extraterritorial application.77 In
this regard, some commentators have proposed a solution through the amendment of Article XX.
Professor Hudec, for instance, advocates the addition of a provision on MEAS within Article XX
of the GATT. This new section would follow the example of Section (h) of the above mentioned
article, creating an exception for trade measures imposed pursuant to obligations in
environmental agreements.78
In this way, Article XX (k) should also set out a method of approval. In the view of Professor
Schoenbaum, for an MEA to satisfy the test of Article XX (k), it should meet the following
requirements: (1) the agreement should be open to all parties having a legitimate interest in the
environmental problem; (2) the restrictions adopted should be reasonably related to the problem
addressed; and (3) the treaty should comply with the jurisdictional norms of international law.79
3.2 Trade and Labor Law
Regarding the law governing the treatment of workers, the WTO does not prescribe any
obligation that WTO members have to fulfill. On the contrary, all of the members preserve their
right to regulate labor practices and implement into their domestic law the policies and
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conventions they deem necessary.80 In this context, Article XX, Section (e) becomes the sole
provision related to labor and reads as follows:
...Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguise restriction on international trade, nothing in this
agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures:
(e) relating to the products of prison labor...
In contrast to the ITO Charter, except for this provision, the articles of GATT did not deal
with labor standards. Article 7 of the ITO stated, “The members recognize that unfair labor
conditions, particularly in the production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and
accordingly, each member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to
eliminate such conditions within its territory. However, as mentioned earlier, the ITO never came
into being.81
Thus, steps to improve working conditions have been taken, so far, through the voluntary
adoption of a series of conventions, most of them under the auspices of the ILO’s wide-ranging
coverage of issues in the world of work.82 The success of the work of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) relied largely on persuasion and the ratification and subsequent inclusion of
labor standards into national legislation. Their compliance has been driven by ethical
considerations.
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Nevertheless, free trade has always been considered a desirable objective. For many, it is not
only compatible with social goals but can successfully collaborate with rising standards of living,
including working conditions.

26

CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ISSUE OF MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR RIGHTS

The reasons most commonly arguable in favor of the international unification of labor and
environmental standards are: (1) the legitimate concerns for the conservation of the environment;
(2) the humanitarian concern in industrialized countries about the poor working conditions or
employment of children in developing countries; and (3) the deceptive idea that lower standards
in a state, in comparison to its trading partners, confers on it an unfair competitive advantage.
Nonetheless, despite the good intentions of most of the supporters in enlarging the WTO
mandate, the formal inclusion of environmental standards, or the so-called social clause, within
the WTO scope entails a real danger that can unnecessarily risk the development of poor
countries. This section critically analyzes the arguments in favor of establishing a link between
labor or environmental standards and trade.
As Pitou Van Dijck and Gerrit Faber note, the inclusion of labor and environmental standards
and their corresponding enforcement mechanisms in the WTO constitution is controversial, and
its disputability can be summarized in four reasons. First, the universality of labor and
environmental standards is questionable. Second, the efficiency and effectiveness of trade-related
measures are doubtful. Third, standards and trade-related enforcement mechanisms affect
international competitiveness and are capable of being abused for protectionist reasons. Fourth,
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the logic of including standards, measures and enforcement mechanisms in WTO rules rather
than other multilateral agreements is disputable.83
4.1 The Universality of Labor and Environmental Standards
Regarding labor standards, the notion that they are based in human rights and, therefore,
should be universally recognized is strongly criticized by many commentators.84 The demand for
the incorporation of a social clause in the WTO regime based on an imprecise idea of
universality of labor rights is not legitimate at all. Indeed, differences between countries are
justified since there are culture-specific labor standards.
Professor Srinivasan highlights the fact that ILO has not yet reached a consensus among its
constituents regarding the identification of a core group of labor rights that can work as
minimum standards and be included in a social clause.85 Thus, it is not surprising that the
enforcement of a set of core standards through the threat of trade sanctions on which there is no
political consensus is perceived by developing countries as driven by protectionist motives.86
Similarly, in the environmental field, scholars such us Verbruggen and Kuik argue that
principles of environmental policy should be universal but that standards may differ in
determined cases.87 Thus, differential standards would be allowed to deal with local
environmental problems, while harmonization of minimum protection levels would be required
in order to deal with international environmental problems.88
However, the development of international environmental principles is fairly recent and may
not always present binding obligations capable of resolving controversial disputes. One of the
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challenges of the post-Uruguay era will be to develop these international environmental
principles and integrate them in trade rules.89 This merging should be founded on the concept of
sustainable development, an objective shared by the trade and environmental regimes, which can
be found in the UN Conference on Environment and Development [Rio Declaration]90 as well as
in the preamble of the agreement establishing the WTO.
The best alternative to making trade and environment regulation mutually supportive is the
establishment of a set of international agreements on the basis of commonly agreed upon
principles and norms which would guarantee the participation of the parties concerned, the
implementation of the agreements and their enforcement.91 Once again, consensus is an
indispensable requirement in order to avoid the negative perception of the trade measures as an
illegal interference in the national sovereignty and a means to serve protectionist interests.
4.2 Effectiveness of Trade-Related Measures
The second point questions the effectiveness of trade measures. Srinivasan, among other
commentators, refers to trade sanctions as an indirect and sometimes ineffective means.92 He
states that it is not inconceivable that a country threatened with trade measures for failure to raise
its labor standards might not respond by raising them but instead choosing to forego gains from
trade.93
Srinivassan argues that rather than introducing minimum labor standards in WTO trade rules,
developed countries can resort to more effective and direct measures. For instance, these
countries may liberalize their immigration policies, support abolishment or reduction of child
89
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labor by means of income transfers to the parents of child workers, or making known their
preferences on the market by refraining from consuming goods produced by unacceptable
means.94
In the same vein, Wouter Tims declines the effectiveness of linking trade with enforcing labor
standards. He asserts that trade measures with a focus on exports only against an exploitative
country would have limited effects, inducing a change of technology or labor conditions in
production earmarked for export and leaving the rest of the industry untouched.95
Studies carried out in India regarding child labor reveal that a large number of children are
invisible workers who do unpaid work and who find no market outlet, such as work within the
household. The number of children who are neither working nor going to school is many times
larger than children who are working. Most of these children are girls who are looking after
siblings.96 This confirms the hypothesis that trade sanctions are not the most adequate alternative
for raising living or working standards and that their action is limited and one-dimencional.
Moreover, the sanctions that critics of the WTO system advocate not only are inefficient but
also can harm developing-country workers, who ironically are rarely consulted about the
application of those measures.97 Thus, the central point of the North-South debate is the
developed country preference for unilateral trade restrictions against developing-country imports
rather than a more efficient remedy, such as negotiated agreements involving financial and
technical assistance.98
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The truth is that development and economic growth have long been the major contributors to
rising living standards. This has led commentators, such as economist Paul Krugman, to assert:
“[E]very successful example of economic development this past century - every case of a poor
nation that worked its way up to a more or less decent, or at least dramatically better, standard of
living - has taken place via globalization; that is, by producing for the world market”...99
In the same way, with respect to the environment, it is evident that trade sanctions can deal
only with one part of the industry. Restricting measures would leave unscathed the sector where
other producers in the same branch, who happen not to export, operate. Moreover it also permits
other products, to be exported without punishment because the violations take place at an earlier
stage in the production process. Thus the environmental objectives would be achieved to a
marginal extend only.100
Thus, trade-positive measures have proved more effective than questionable trade restrictions;
however the latter are more facile to approve than serious but more costly commitments, the
Shrimp/Turtle case is a good example.101 The U.S. legislation imposing an import ban om shrimp
products was easier to pass than financing serious environmental studies of the local sea turtle
problems in developing countries because the ban satisfied the U.S. shrimp industry interests.
Positive measures, the most effective way to address the environmental issue without negative
consequences for developing-country industry, were laid aside.102
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To borrow the words of Gregory Shaffer, the result is developed country legislation that
triggers controversial disputes brought before the WTO, ensuing challenges to WTO legitimacy,
and “largely ineffective” environmental protection.103
4.3 The danger of protectionist abuse
The third premise, which questions the future incorporation of minimum standards and traderelated enforcement mechanisms is the high probabilities that imposition of sanctions is abused
for protectionist reasons. This view is not strange considering the suspicious behavior of its
principal supporters.
In 1999, a high and rising account deficit in the United States and persistent unemployment in
the large European Union economies contributed to an anti-free bias and exacerbation of
protectionist pressures. Over the years, the idea that trade with low-wage countries was
depressing United States incomes attracted more supporters. The general opinion was that the
United States must not trade with such countries. While in the European Union the idea of unjust
foreign competition was the perfect excuse to disguise dysfunctional domestic policies that
produced chronically high unemployment.104
The proposal to further empower the WTO by introducing new areas such as investment,
competition, government procurement, and labor and environmental standards seems to be an
insurmountable disagreement between developed and developing countries.105 In a context where
the United States and the European Union insisted on linking trade with labor and environmental
rights while tariff barriers on textiles, apparel, steel, dairy and agricultural products remained
stubbornly high, standards were perceived as a new pretext for rich country protectionism.106
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The suspicion is strongly confirmed in the observation of the conduct of industrialized
countries vis-à- vis the fulfillment of environmental or labor commitments. The United States
has not only failed to pay US$1,700,000,000 in United Nations dues, it has successfully
pressured the UN to reduce the amount of its allotment, even though it was based on a smaller
contribution in terms of the United States per capita wealth than for any other developed
country.107
Moreover, contrary to Seattle, there has been no mass protest against the United States’
refusal to take domestic measures to reduce its contribution to global warming. Ironically, the
U.S. is responsible for over one third of all green house emissions. Another example is the
willingness of developed countries to join multilateral efforts to solve environmental problems.
Under pressure from U.S. pharmaceutical and petroleum interests, the United States refused to
ratify the UN Convention on Bio-Diversity or the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming.108
In the labor field, the United States, despite its position as a leading proponent of a social
clause in the WTO, has vigorously opposed external scrutiny of its own human rights record
through existing mechanisms. Given these inconsistencies between its claims and practice,
developing countries are in a reasonable position as to argue that proposed standardization of
labor rights is not more than an excuse to protect the jobs of American workers.109
Indeed, an empirical study carried out by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) found little evidence of a linkage between abuse of labor standards and
the establishment of a competitive trade advantage. The survey found that any resulting
economic benefits were minor and short-lived. Moreover, respect for, or denial of, core labor
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standards has never been an important determinant of investment decisions by foreign
investors.110
Serious violations of core labor rights really occur because the systems of sub-contracting and
out-sourcing, by which many multinational companies organize their production, are associated
with human rights abuses. According to Kearney, retailers are paying such low prices that the
supplying companies are forced to exploit their workforce, pay low wages, insist on long
working hours and often include the employment of children. Child labor has everything to do
with the European and United States multinational companies, merchandisers, and retailers. They
are as guilty, if not more guilty, than local employers who beat, abuse and enslave children as
young as four years old.111
Given this dichotomy, the fierce opposition of developing countries before any attempt for
linking labor or environmental standards to trade, to the extent of rejecting even the
incorporation of the issue in the WTO agenda cannot be unexpected. The point of view of these
countries can be well expressed by opinions as radical as that of the Malaysian government,
when its delegate stated that the WTO’s position on a social clause was “[N]o way, no
discussions, no continuing work.”112
4.4 Disputability of the Legitimacy of the Role of the WTO in Setting and Enforcing Standards
The last point is the disputability of the logic of including standards, measures and
enforcement mechanisms in WTO rules rather than other multilateral agreements or specialized
agencies. Until recently, the WTO did not give an explicit mandate either with respect to labor
standards and social development nor to environmental standards. Article XX comprises general
exceptions to WTO’s rules and principles under special circumstances but does not determine the
110
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role that the WTO should play in these areas. Due to that fact, commentators such as Pitou Van
Dijck have argued that the WTO should not itself be involved in standard setting.113
Srinivasan, among others, maintains that the consensus through specialized agencies such as
ILO should be pursued in setting standards. However, the functions of the existing multilateral
institutions need to be clearly defined, and policy-making at both the national and international
levels calls for greater coherence.114
Those who see merit in addressing non-trade issues, such as human rights labor standards,
and environmental protection in existing institutions other than the WTO, propose that the
United Nations and its specialized agencies be strengthened and provided with the necessary
resources to carry out their tasks successfully.115 In their view the expanding missions of the
international economic organizations are resulting in the centralization of power and resources in
the WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Found in detriment of other
specialized institutions and the United Nations system as a whole.116
This opinion is founded upon different studies which have provided evidence of the adverse
results developing nations have experienced as a result of overlapping functions exercised by
economic institutions. Those affected countries are the consumers of these organizations’
services.117
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CHAPTER 5
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE WTO SCOPE: A GOOD OR
BAD EXAMPLE FOR ENLARGING THE WTO MANDATE
5.1 Reasons for the IPRs Incorporation within the WTO System
On repeated occasion, the critics of the trading system have asserted that the WTO’s
treatment of intellectual property rights should be emulated with environmental or social
purposes. This critizism is due to the fact that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) mandates harmonized recognition and enforcement of
patents, copyright and other intellectual property rights.118
Indeed, by virtue of the TRIPS Agreement, a WTO member may impose import restrictions
on products and services entirely unrelated to the violated property right in question. All this has
led to social activists and environmental groups to argue that there is no valid reason why the
WTO should not enforce core labor standards and environmental norms if it can protect
Madonna’s, Puff Daddy’s, and Eli Lillys’s royalties.119
The starting point of this analysis is the concept of intellectual property [IP] itself. IP can be
defined as creations of the human mind, these creations translated into inventive works such as
books, paintings, and inventions, including designs and trademarks. Contrary to the nature of
labor rights or environmentally inspired rules, IP rules are susceptible to trade and exploitation in
order to obtain economic gains. In other words they are objects of commerce.
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Intellectual property rights [IPRS] then are legal rights governing the use of such creations.
There is a wide array of rights, such as patents, trade-marks or copyrights, with a different
purpose and effect; however, as a general rule, all of them exclude third parties from exploiting
protected subject matter, without explicit authorization of the right holder, for a determined time
period.120 This allows IPRS owners to exploit their creations without fear of losing control over
their use which, in turn, would presumably help in their dissemination.
The exploitative potential of these creations has produced a big change in the developed
countries’ economies. These changes has been experienced by the economy of the United States,
where, in the early 1980’s, began a gradual but fundamental transformation from a
manufacturing to an information-based economy.121 As a result, the need for a set of rules which
govern the new trade in information goods while encompassing the protection of new
technologies became indispensable.122
The problems occur because domestic legislation is addressed towards the pursuance of a
balance between the economic interest of the IP right holders and the public interest in having
access to new knowledge, while the TRIPS Agreement is focused on the capture of economic
gains from the exploitation of Intellectual property. This inconsistency benefits developed
countries, which are technology exporters, while developing countries remain in the periphery,
bearing the burden of new and costly obligations in exchange of nothing.123
Thus, developing countries on the cusp of development, such as Brazil and India, whose
markets represent a wide range of possibilities to foreign investors and increasing levels of
120
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technology, have become, according to Ruth L. Gana decisive factors for the merging of trade
and intellectual property rights.124
5.2 Gaps in the WTO Regime for IPRs Protection: Does the System Work for Everybody?
The intellectual property rights system has been largely unable to recognize or value nonwestern forms of knowledge generation like those of the existing indigenous and local
communities. This knowledge is unsuitable with the dominant culture’s concept of “scientific”
and so remains unprotected and free to outside appropriation.125
This problem occurs because conditions for protection are also based on culturally determined
definitions that respond to developed countries’ economic interests. Moreover, terminology and
concepts embodied in IPRS legislation favor the appropriation of local knowledge. Definitions of
what is wild as opposed to cultivated, what is knowledge, who can posses it, and what can be
considered innovations or inventions are exclusively directed to the protection of western forms
of knowledge, ignoring the interests of local communities whose knowledge, resources and
informal system of knowledge-transmission cannot satisfy the foreign requirements. Therefore,
traditional knowledge is confined to the field of public domain.126
The area of traditional medicine is a prime example of this problem. Common remedies used
today were first developed by healers before there was any contact with industrial societies.127
For example, the most effective treatment for post-therapeutic neuralgia is hot pepper utilized as
a component of modern pain relievers. It was discovered after scientists observed its use by
South American indigenous tribes. Pilocarpine, used to treat glaucoma, was first used by
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indigenous peoples in Brazil. And D-tubocurarine, a skeletal muscle relaxant used in
anesthesiology, was derived from a concoction of arrow poison used by Amazonian Indians.128
The question that arises is whether a developing country’s court can refuse to grant a patent
for a particular drug based on its lack of originality if native healers have been using its
component in more rudimentary forms. And even more important, can a developing country
patentee attempt to patent traditional medicine in a developed country? The obstacles would
likely be impossible to overcome since industrialized nations usually treat traditional medicine or
native knowledge as a product of nature and, therefore do not satisfy novelty requirements.129
Another inconvenience for native communities in the path towards the recognition of their IP
rights is the fact that the system recognizes IPRS only as private rights on an individual basis.
Collective rights belonging to a community are unsuitable under this conception.130 Moreover,
traditional knowledge is transmitted from one generation to another. This method does not meet
the novelty requirement that patent law demands.131
The condition of non-obviousness, which requires that an invention not be merely the next
logical step after prior knowledge, also deprives the indigenous communities’ inventions or
discoveries of the necessary characteristics for their patentability. For instance, the prior
knowledge of a plant’s effect would invalidate any unprocessed indigenous use of the plant.132
Roht Arriaza notes the irrelevance for indigenous people of showing unexpectedly improved
properties, taking into account that local community’s discoveries, products and innovations are
largely used for local consumption, which responds to their concrete necessities.
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Patent law, in addition, requires that the subject matter of a patent is not the discovery of
some natural phenomenon or a product of nature. This impedes the possibility of patenting a
medicinal plant. However, if in using the same plant a scientist isolates the active substance, the
product obtained becomes patentable. The knowledge of the substance properties may have been
widely known by indigenous communities, but the IP system recognizes neither the discovery of
the beneficial uses nor the efforts involved in selecting and preserving the same genetic
qualities.133
The purposes driving the inventiveness and knowledge-seeking of indigenous people give rise
to another dissociation with respect to the IP system. The TRIPS Agreement, the nuclear set of
IP rules, makes it evident that the western view of the aims of intellectual investigation bows to
economic motives. From the TRIPS perspective, an inventor produces in order to trade the
product of her/his invention. To the contrary, inventions of local communities are produced
mainly to satisfy their needs. This does not fit within the TRIPS logic.134
5.3 Impacts of the TRIPS Agreement on Developing Countries
5.3.1 On Development and Technology Access
The role that intellectual property rights has played in development with respect to the third
world has been so indecisive that some commentators, such as Penrose, have asserted the view
that third-world countries should be exempt from any international patent arrangement. Afterall,
they argue, foreign patents tend more to restrict than to advance their industrial technique.
Furthermore, there is the desirability of encouraging the development of these countries.135
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IPRS are supposedly granted as a means of fostering the production of inventions that in turn
promote society’s development. The rights concession is a reward granted to the patentee in
exchange for a developmental benefit associated with his/her particular invention. The patent
system, for instance, is designed to induce such inventions that otherwise would not be available.
In this way, the right holder is the only one capable of exploiting the patented invention,
precluding domestic competition. Thus, local enterprises cannot sell the invention within their
home country, compete in the export market or even import from countries where the invention
may be legally produced.136
However, at least for developing countries, the concession of IPRS, in particular for patents,
does not necessarily lead to development. In contrast to what happens in developed societies, the
majority of patents granted by developing countries are conferred to foreigners. Explanation can
be found in the fact that inventions are induced by domestic patent systems of countries with
significant markets. It is not surprising, then, that the primary markets of the patent owners are in
the markets of developed countries.137
There are very few inventions made by foreign enterprises in developing countries on the
grounds of the existence of a patent system. Therefore, the most effective way for a developing
country to obtain benefits from inventions is to be free of any restraints.138 The case of
Tagament, an ulcer-treating medication, illustrates this assertion. SmithKline-Beckman alleged
having lost one-half of the market, or a loss of $50 million in revenue, due to an Argentinian
patent law that excluded pharmaceuticals from patent protection. A generic producer in that
country duplicated the unpatented compound and put it in the market competing with Tagamet.
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This benefited the development of local enterprises and facilitated resource retention and
consumer savings in Argentina.139
In sum, it is clear that by protecting non-patent induced inventions, particularly foreign
inventions, developing countries neither would attain major benefits nor could assure more
development. On the contrary, since a patent holder can utilize the period of monopoly
restriction to prevent competition, create dependencies, or make windfall profits at the right
moment, such protection can have serious consequences hindering the realization of the rights to
health, food, education, and access to information, among others.140
Indeed, the TRIPS stipulation that patent protection should cover both imported products as
well as those manufactured locally has allowed patent owners to reach the conclusion that there
is no need to work on the patented product within the country granting the right. Thus, the
company that controls the patent can export the finished product rather than transfer technology
or make direct foreign investments in that country.141
A WTO dispute between the United States and Brazil, with Brazil seeking to incorporate a socalled local working clause in its national legislation, can better illustrate the issue in question.
The Brazilian government wanted to impose the requirement that a product had to be produced
locally as a precondition to granting a patent. This requirement was in line with its country’s
necessity to accede to the new technologies. In the end, the dispute was withdrawn but the issue
was left unresolved without any authoritative interpretation and with the constant danger of
possible U.S. recourse to the WTO for the enforcement of the TRIPS.142
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In other words, different realities make developing countries extremely sensible to the
consequences of unlimited IPRS protection. A balance between private and public competing
interests must be urgently sought. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama refer to this issue,
pointing out that in contrast to the rest of the Uruguay Round’s agenda, negotiations over TRIPS
ironically were not about freeing trade. Rather, they were about more protection and tighter
control. The concentration of ownership of IPRS in developed countries and powerful non-state
actors, has made the prevailing definitions of IPRS take more account of the interests of the
producers of knowledge than they do the users.143
5.3.2 On the Realization of the Right to Health
Distinct actors of international law, in particular the World Trade Organization, have
manifested their concerns about the catastrophic consequences that can take place in a health
market in which the motive of profit is paramount, especially in poor countries.144 The United
Nations Commission on Human Rights recognized in the resolution 2000/7 that the TRIPS
Agreement could severely affect the enjoyment of the right to health in particular through its
effect on access to pharmaceuticals.145
While the IP legislation has been designed to act as an incentive for the innovation of new and
more effective medicines, in practice, the strict implementation of increased standards for
intellectual property rights protection may not necessarily improve the observance of the right to
health. Indeed, if protection purely serves to the materialization of the interests of those who
control the market instead of broader social goals, IPRS can provide a basis for increased cost of
medicines, hospitals and other forms of health care.
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IPRS can be abused in a manner that can prevent the distribution of new medicines helpful to
poor countries whose population cannot afford the prices charged by patent owners.146 Moreover,
the fact that right holders can obtain major benefits in countries with strong markets has led
pharmaceuticals and researchers to deviate their attention away from the so-called “unprofitable
diseases.” For instance, between 1975 and 1996 only 11 of the 1,223 new chemical entities in the
market were for the treatment of tropical diseases. Afflictions that predominantly affect poor
countries’ populations, especially tuberculosis and malaria, still remain relatively underresearched.147
The situation can get worse considering the pressure that is being exerted in bilateral contexts
to force developing countries to undertake major obligations other than those stipulated in
TRIPS. This has become known as “TRIPS plus,” which comprises everything from efforts to
extend patent life beyond the 20-year minimum to attempts to limit the use of exceptions such
compulsory licensing in ways not required by TRIPS.148
Thus, many developing and less developed countries have resorted to mechanisms such as
parallel importation or compulsory licensing to face the aforementioned inconveniences. The
former allows for improving access to cheaper drugs by importing the products legally marketed
in another country at a cheaper price, irrespective of the consent of the patent holder. Meanwhile,
the latter encourages the local production of generic substitutes by issuing a non-exclusive
license to a third party produce similar compounds of a patented drug. This authorization is
granted by a government authority regardless of the approbation of the patent owner and before
the patent expires.
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However, despite the fact that these mechanisms are generally granted on the ground of the
public interest or in cases of national emergency, they could eventually be considered as more
restrictive than the TRIPS Agreement allows. Their utilization by developing countries increases
the possibilities of being challenged before the WTO.
The UNDP Human Development Report shows how the generic production can help
developing countries’ populations to gain access to treatments. In India, Flucanazole, a costly
drug used in the HIV treatment, is generically produced at a price of $55 for 150 milligrams, a
price much too reasonable in comparison with $697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia and $817 in
the Philippines.149 Likewise, a report of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
noted that the AZT treatment is produced at $239 in the United States while the price of the
generic is $48 in India.150
Only a fraction of the affected people, approximately 400,000, who live mainly in Europe and
North America have access to patented anti-retroviral therapy. For the great majority of these
people, the production and distribution of generic to a more affordable price is a question of life
or death.151
The TRIPS Agreement embraces a public health protection provision through which members
may exclude from patentability determined inventions necessary to protect public order or
morality, including human, animal or plant life or health. Under this provision a country may
deny a patent to a particular drug or to all drugs as long as it has a legitimate health reason to
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prevent their commercialization. Nevertheless, this provision comes along with a prohibition of
commercial exploitation of the invention by the country applying the exception..152
This prohibition considerably limits the scope of the public health provision. For instance, it
does not allow for either a non-patent system without restrictions to produce and sell generic
products or a compulsory licensing mechanism which favors the local generic drugs’ production
and the development of domestic industry. Both of the methods contemplate a future commercial
exploitation of generic products.153
For similar reasons, the provision in question does not provide support for alternatives which
speed generic production or encourage technology transfer, such as shortening patent terms and
the local working clause. In applying this provision, third-world countries denying patentability
for essential drugs would have only one way to fulfill their health goals: the free distribution of
medicines through a state-owned marketing board, quasi-state entity or non-profit
manufacturers.154
In addition to the requirement examined above, a nation seeking to implement the public
health provision will have to surpass another more difficult obstacle: the measure adopted must
be deemed necessary. In this matter, relevant precedent, applied by GATT dispute settlement
panels in interpreting GATT Article XX, will play a central role due to the similarity in language
and purpose. Prior cases could help to avoid the least trade-restrictive alternative test, which
constitutes a questioned encroachment on national sovereignty.155
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In sum, states should face what seem to be irreconcilable obligations under international law.
On one hand, there is the duty to protect human life and dignity, while on the other hand, there is
obligation to confer full IPRS protection. Until now, the balance had been tilted on the IPRS side
because the respect for the rights comprised in the TRIPS Agreement is backed by the WTO, one
of the most powerful international organizations in the world.156
5.3.3 On the Accessibility to IPRs Systems of Developed Countries and Costs to Developing
Countries of Granting IP Protection
The costs to obtain intellectual property protection in a developed country is, for a thirdworld inventor, as much prohibitively expensive as it is for their governments to grant IP rights
to foreigners. For instance, the patent application process in most developed countries is usually
very costly and the complexity of legal requirements that an applicant must know and manage
makes the way particularly adverse for developing country applicants.157
On the other hand, the costs of implementing a patent system that adjusts to the characteristics
that the TRIPS Agreement comprises demands a high percentage of a country’s resources be
employed in covering administrative expenditures. For instance, only the supply of an efficient
trained technical personnel for the administration of a patent-granting agency is a need
considerably more difficult to afford for developing countries.158 To borrow the words of Samuel
Oddi, in a cost-benefit analysis related to the application of the TRIPS Agreement, the wide
range of obstacles that developing have to face, place these countries to the cost side.
However, the TRIPS Agreement offers some flexibility, which could allow underdeveloped
societies to benefit from the TRIPS Agreement regime. Their success depends on how the
agreement is construed and implemented. Thus, the agreement must be interpreted in such a way
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as to permit third world countries to develop domestic laws that conform to specific national
concerns and to use intellectual property to further development goals.159
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
The first initiatives toward the creation of the World Trade Organization were carried out
within the context of World War II. The adverse repercussion that strict protectionist policies had
on external trade relations led the nations to pursue the establishment of a post-World War
system to regulate world trade. They were aware that a multilateral, rules-based system would
attain stability and certainty for international transactions.
However, different attempts to constitute what was called the International Trade
Organization (ITO) failed after various attempts. The failures were due in great part to the
reticence of the leading trading nations that did not want to leave key aspects of domestic life in
hands of an international institution. Creating such a powerful organization was seen as a threat
to their sovereignty. The ITO never came into existence, but the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade became the central organization for coordinating national policies affecting
international trade.
All troubled history shows the true will of the actual members of the WTO in ratifying its
charter. Since the very beginning, nations sought an institution for international trade cooperation
which administers the enacted agreements and provides a forum for negotiations and an impartial
and specialized dispute settlement system instead of a universal authority governing all aspects
of the members life.
The main objective of the members participation in the multilateral system has been to benefit
from new and improved concessions in areas that confer upon them a comparative advantage at
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the end of the negotiation process.160 Thus, enlarging the mandate of the WTO to such an extent
as to cover aspects belonging to domestic spheres is logically perceived as an illegitimate
intrusion and a deviation of original targets.
Nevertheless, although impingement on the states’ sovereignty is by no means desired, the
WTO regime, as an integral part of an emerging global governance architecture, must be
coherent with other areas comprising international law. Until recently, the WTO rules had not
compelled its members to follow determined standards in their domestic law with regard to the
protection of their own environment or the regulation of labor practices. But the respect of
nations’ sovereignty doesn’t mean that the trade regime should hinder environmental or social
goals.
The central WTO agreements contemplate exceptions on environmental and labor grounds,
which permit the members to depart from their trading obligations under determined
circumstances and conditions. The success of these measures will depend in large part on the
interpretation adopted by the dispute settlement bodies. So far, the outcome of the WTO
decisions has not favored the application of unilateral measures or the imposition of trade
sanctions with environmental or social aims. However, there has been great improvement
regarding the construction given to the exceptions of GATT Article XX. This new interpretation
could open the doors to measures adopted for social and environmental concerns.
Chapter Three advanced some purposes to allow a larger application of environmental or
social-friendly measures. Nevertheless, multilaterally adopted policies are preferred for solving
global problems. Within this background, multinational environmental agreements and
agreements under the auspices of ILO must be pursued.
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It is clear that supporters of the incorporation of labor and environmental standards and their
enforcement through the WTO, mainly developed countries, have not yet succeeded in proving
its legitimacy. On the contrary, there is a founded fear that the addition of minimum standards in
these matters would be used to satisfy protectionist interests.
The developed countries’ lack of involvement in environmental or social aims has contributed
in giving founded reasons for third world countries to be suspicious from their good intentions.
As argued above, the WTO should coordinate its work with specialized agencies and take into
account environmental and social objectives in implementing trade policies but should not
constitute itself in the regulating entity in these matters.
One of the most solid arguments against linkage is the existence of other methods of
responding to social or environmental concerns. These methods would not entail the use of trade
sanctions for which imply less danger and broader acceptation. Scholars as Srinivasan firmly
maintain the adequacy of resorting to these less controversial mechanisms. He advances a series
of more effective and direct measures to improve working conditions in poor countries without
resorting to the incorporation of minimum standards. Mechanisms, such us lifting immigration
restrictions in developed countries or taking into account citizens’ actions with market’s
repercussions, can better serve in the task of achieving legitimate goals.161
Also, some of the impacts of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights on third world countries has been examined ane the conclusion is clear. This
agreement, repeatedly cited as an example of the WTO extending its arms to protect rights other
than trade, is not always suitable for other sorts of rights and objectives.
IPRS are rights that, due to their own nature, are susceptible to trade. The subject matter of
the rights, namely the innovations, can also be considered objects of commerce that can be
161
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bought and sold in the market. The TRIPS Agreement is primarily concerned with restructuring
and setting the trade rules to prepare the market for this new trade in information goods and
technology.
It is certainly true that trade can affect other areas, such as labor rights and the environment.
However, these areas are not intimately related to commerce like intellectual property. As a
result, their incorporation in the trade arena could be antagonistic precisely to those for whom its
attempts to help. Indeed, it is worthy to highlight how the addition of IP standards within the
WTO regulation still presents some gaps which keeps developing countries in the periphery,
preventing them from benefitting from the Agreement.
In sum, there are considerable advantages of being part of the multilateral trading system and
freer trade can be beneficial and profitable. Nevertheless, a balance between private and public
interest, as well as a more socially-sensible economic regime are indispensable for the system to
work the way it purports to work.

52

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I-Books
1. Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, The Anatomy Series of International Institutions, An
Anatomy of the World Trade Organization (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos ed., 1997).
2. Arthur E Appleton, Environmental Labelling Programmes: International Trade Law
Implications (1997).
3. J.G. Castel Extraterritoriality in International Trade Canada and United States of America
Practices Compared (1988).
4. Carlos M. Correa Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The
TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options (1988).
5. Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (1994).
6. Conor Foley, Global Trade, Labor and Human Rights (2000).
7. Dr. Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products (2002).
8. John H. Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases Materials and
Text, (3rd ed., 2000).
9. John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations (2nd ed. 1997).
10. Hakan Nordstrom & Scott Vaughan, Special Studies 4, Trade and Environment (2000).
11. Joseph A. McMahon, Agricultural Trade, Protectionism and the Problems of Development:
A Legal Perspective (1992).

53
12. Gary P. Sampson, The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance (2001).
13. Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (2nd ed.
1999).
14. Pitou Van Dijck & Gerrit Faber, Challenges to the New World Trade Organization (1996).
15. David Vogel, Trading Up, Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy
(1995).
16. Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (2001).
17. Rodern Wilkison, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organization: The Architecture and
Extention of International Trade Regulation (2000).

II-Law Review Articles
1. Padideh Ala’i, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: A Human Rights Critique of the
WTO: Some Preliminary Observations, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 537 (2001).
2. Celso L. N. Amorim, The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24 Fordham
Int’l L.J. 95 (2000).
3. Amy E. Belanger, Internationally Recognized Worker Rights and the Efficacy of the
Generalized System of Preferences: A Guatemalan Case Study, 11 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y
101 (1996).
4. Raj Bhala, Mrs. Watu: Seven Steps to Trade Sanctions Analysis, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 565
(1999).
5. Daniel D. Bradlow, Global Trade Issues in the New Millenium: Some Preliminary Thoughts
on Developing Countries, NGOS and the Reform of the WTO, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
503 (2001).

54
6. Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Non-governmental Interests, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J.
173 (2000).
7. Julie Cromer Recent Developments: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: What They Could
Mean for Health and Safety Regulations Under GATT, 36 Harv. Int’l L. J. 557 (1995).
8. Janelle M. Diller and David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the
Harmonization of International Law, 91 A.J.I.L. 663 (1997).
9. David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and
Environment Debate, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 279 (2001).
10. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Global Trade Issues in the New Millenium: The WTO in Transition: of
Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 Geo. Wash, Int’l L. Rev. 979 (2001).
11. Jenness Duke, Enforcement of Human Rights on Multi-National Corporations: Global
Climate, Strategies and Trends for Compliance, 28 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 339 (2000).
12. Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 Vand. J.
Transnat’l L. 735 (1996).
13. Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21
Mich. J. Int’l L. 975 (2000).
14. Rebecca A. Hoelting, After Rio, The Sustainable Development Concept Following the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 24 Ga. J. Int’l L. 117 (1994).
15. Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-making, 27 Cornell Int’l
L.J. 699 (1994).
16. Hilary K. Josephs, Global Trade Issues in the New Millenium: Upstairs, Trade Law;
Downstairs, Labor Law, 33 Geo. Wash Int’l L. Rev. 849 (2001).

55
17. Christopher M. Kern, Child Labor: The International Law and Corporate Impact, 27
Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 177 (2000).
18. Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 Minn. J. Global Trade 195 (1995).
19. Environmental Justice without Borders: The Need for an International Court of the
Environment to Protect Fundamental Environmental Rights, 32 GW J. Int’l L. & Econ. 351
(2000).
20. Mike Moore, The World Trade Organization, Globalization, and the Future of the
International Trade Essay: The WTO, Looking Ahead, 24 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1 (2000).
21. Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Non-governmental Parties in the World Trade
Organization: Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 295 (1996).
22. A Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and the Third World Development: Reality
or myth?, 1987 Duke L. J. 831 (1987).
23. Dale Arthur Oesterle, The WTO Reaches Out to the Environmentalists: Is it Too Little, Too
Late?, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. Y. B. 1 (1999).
24. Hans-Joachim Priess & Dr. Christian Pitschas, Protection of Public Health and the Role of
the Precautionary Principle under WTO Law: A Trojan Horse before Geneva’s Walls?, 24
Fordham Int’l L.J. 519 (2000).
25. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and local Communities, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 919 (1996).
26. James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The role and Influence of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 769 (2000).

56
27. Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of the Natural
Environment: Recent Trends in the Interpretation of GATT Article XX (b) and (g), 10
Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 271 (2000).
28. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 A. J. I. L. 268 (1997).
29. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
30. Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on TradeLabor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 Fordham Int’l L. J. 608
(2000).
31. Jerry Stanton, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price Controls on Pharmaceuticals,
16 Conn. J. Int’l L. 149 (2000).
32. Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 A. J. I. L.
489 (2001).
33. Opportunities in the WTO for Increased Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure the Rules
Work for all and that Special Needs are Addressed, 24 Fordham Int’l L. J. 652 (2000).
34. Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U.
Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 61 (2001).
35. Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv. Int’l L. J. 333 (1999).
36. Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize
Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to
Third World Countries, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1069 (1996).

57
37. Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the WTO: The refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on
Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 563 (2000).

III-Journals
1. Frank Biermann, The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in World Trade Law, Options for
Reconciling the Emerging North-South Conflict, in Journal of World Trade 421 (June 2001).
2. Dilip K. Das, Debacle at Seattle, The Way the Cookie Crumbled, in Journal of World Trade
181 (October 2000).
3. William A. Dymond & Michael M. Hart, Post-Modern Trade Policy, Reflections on the
Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations after Seattle, in Journal of World Trade 21
(June 2000).
4. Mary E. Footer, Developing Country Practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute Settlement, in
Journal of World Trade 55 (February 2001).
5. Hoe Lim, Trade and Human Rights, What’s at issue?, in Journal of World Trade 275 (April
2001).
6. Gabrielle Marceau, Conflict of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, The Relationship
between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties, in Journal of World Trade 1081
(December 20001).
7. Pierre Sauvé, Developing Countries and the GATS 2000 Round, in Journal of World Trade
85 (April 2000).

58

IV-International Documents

1. Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, opened for signature May 3, 1969, 1156
UNTS 331.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
3. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
4. U. N. ESCOR Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001).
5. U. N. ESCOR Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53rd Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, (2001).
6. U. N. ESCOR Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/11, (2001).
7. U. N. ESCOR Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess.,
Agenda Item 4, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, (2001).

V-Cases
1. In Re Canada’s Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 I.T.R.D. 1026, (Oct. 16,
1989).
2. GATT Dispute Panel Report: United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594
(1991).

59
3. Thailand Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) 200 (1990), 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991).
4. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994).
5. United States Taxes on Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1937 (1994).
6. United States Import Prohibitions on Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Panel’s Report May 15,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 832, Appellate Body’s Report Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118.
7. Gasoline Appellate Report: United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1, (Apr. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).

VI-Websites
1. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global
Consultation, <http://www.ciesin.org/docs/010-152/010-152.html> [last visited on Oct. 6,
2002].
2. The World Trade Organization and Its Committee on Trade and Environment, available at
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e//envir_e/issu1_e.htm> [last visited Dec. 19, 2002].
3. The Committee on Trade and Environment and the Trade Laws, the MEAS and the
differences at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte01_e.htm> [last visited Dec.
19, 2002].
4. Somesh K Mathur, Child Labour: Some Issues, Correlates and Cures, available at
<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Mathurlabor.pdf> [last visited Feb. 4, 2003].

